In their 1984 article, Priest and Klein show that a simple divergent expectations model of the decision to litigate leads to a plaintiff success rate at trial that approaches 50 percent as the fraction of cases going to trial approaches zero. However, an extensive empirical literature has documented that plaintiffs win far fewer than half of their cases. As Priest and Klein observe, this conflict between the predictions of the model and the empirical literature may be attributable to violations in the data of the assumptions behind the simple model. Based on data from 3,529 cases, we find that "multimodal" case characteristics associated with violations of these assumptions cause plaintiff win rates to deviate from the 50-percent baseline in the manner that simple law-and-economics models would suggest. In other words, among cases that conform more closely to the assumptions underlying the simple divergent expectations model, the plaintiff win rate is closer to 50 percent. The 50 percent rule is actually a limiting implication of a selection effect that arises out of a simple divergent expectations model of the decision to litigate. In that model, each party estimates the quality of the plaintiff's claim with error, and the plaintiff settles when the defendant's offer is at least as large as the plaintiff's estimate of the value of her claim. Priest and Klein observe that cases selected for litigation are likely to be the difficult and uncertain ones-that is, the cases in which the true quality of the claim is close to the quality level needed for the plaintiff to win if the claim were to be tried-because the clear-cut cases will be more likely to settle before trial (or may never evolve into filed cases at all). The difficult and uncertain cases, in turn, are likely to be those that, on average, result in about half the victories going to one party and about half to the other.5
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multimodal approach hypothesizes that violations of assumptions of the simple divergent expectations model affect the selection of cases for litigation, thereby driving the plaintiff win rate away from 50 percent.
Based on data from 3,529 cases decided by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals between 1982 and 1987, our findings indicate that the multimodal approach explains plaintiff win rates of less than 50 percent within the context of a divergent expectations model. First, case characteristics associated with violations of assumptions of the divergent expectations model affect plaintiff win rates in the manner that simple law-andeconomics models would predict. Second, we find that controlling for multimodal characteristics brings the plaintiff win rate closer to 50 percent. In other words, among cases that conform more closely to the assumptions underlying the Priest-Klein model, the plaintiff win rate is closer to 50 percent. Also, the data show that the multimodal approach applies in a similar fashion at each stage of the appeals process, further supporting its applicability.
The first part of this article gives a brief review of the mechanics of the theoretical model behind the Priest-Klein paper and the simple version of the 50 percent rule, coupled with a cataloging of findings in the previous empirical literature. The second part of this article suggests how a multimodal approach can reconcile the selection hypothesis with observed plaintiff win rates by explaining how assumptions implicit in the divergent expectations model may be violated in actual cases. The third section outlines the appellate data that we use. The fourth section presents our econometric model and empirical results. The fifth section presents our conclusion that a multimodal approach to explaining the selection of cases for litigation can improve the fit between the theory and the data.
I. PREVIOUS LITERATURE
A. Theoretical Results
The Priest-Klein hypothesis is based on a divergent expectations model of the selection of cases for litigation.6 In this model, cases have a true "quality" level Y' such that all cases with Y' greater than some "decision standard" D would be decided for the plaintiff if they were tried to a The theoretical motivation behind the 50 percent rule is as follows. If (C -S)/J is relatively high, say, 0.3,7 then cases that fail to settle will be those with P, > Pd, which will be disproportionately cases with Y' D-cases with the true quality close to the decision standard-because it is in those close cases that normal differences in estimation of quality across parties lead to large differences in the estimated probability of winning at trial. Put another way, if both parties agree that the plaintiff has a very small chance of winning, for example, Y' << D, then differences in parties' assessment of case quality are unlikely to be large enough to prevent the parties from settling.
B. Empirical Results
Researchers have examined plaintiff win rates, both in the trial phase (including pretrial motions) and on appeal, in order to assess the 50 percent hypothesis, across a diverse group of data sets. A sample of studies from this large literature are summarized in Table 1 and listed in Appendix A.
The studies in Table 1 indicate that plaintiffs generally win less than 50 percent of their cases at all phases of the legal process.8 At the pretrial stage, for example, Eisenberg rejects the hypothesis that plaintiffs win 50 percent of all motions in a sample of 204,560 cases in Federal District Court.9 Although plaintiff win rates of less than 50 percent may be an American phenomenon, deviation from the 50 percent rule is not. Ram-seyer and Nakazato, for example, analyze approximately 770,000 civil actions from Japanese courts and find that plaintiff success rates are significantly greater than 50 percent.'0 Furthermore, several different measures of plaintiff success suggest that deviation from the 50 percent rule persists at the appellate stage. Plaintiffs-at-trial who appeal win fewer than 50 percent of their cases at the appellate level. In addition, appellants as a class win fewer than 50 percent of their appeals, whether they were plaintiffs-or defendants-at-trial.
Recent empirical work provides support for the selection hypothesis more generally, despite low plaintiff win rates. Siegelman and Donohue, for example, find that the employment discrimination cases filed during recessions are more likely to be settled than the employment discrimination cases filed during booms, due to a selection effect that leads parties to be less likely to litigate relatively weak cases. Along these lines, Waldfogel finds support for the selection hypothesis based on the fact that judges who are more likely to try cases to a verdict have plaintiff win rates that are further from 50 percent.
II. RECONCILING THE SELECTION HYPOTHESIS WITH OBSERVED PLAINTIFF WIN RATES: A MULTIMODAL APPROACH
The multimodal approach attempts to reconcile the selection hypothesis with observed plaintiff win rates by investigating whether case characteristics associated with violations of assumptions of the simple divergent expectations model affect the selection of cases for litigation. We consider seven characteristics of cases that law-and-economics models predict would affect the plaintiff win rate in litigated cases within the divergent expectations framework. In this section, we discuss each of the seven case characteristics that we examine and how each of them would affect plaintiff win rates within the divergent expectations framework. Differential Stakes. As Priest and Klein observe, the hypothesis assumes that the stakes of the parties in the litigation are the same-that is, that the defendant stands to lose as much as the plaintiff stands to gain, no more or less." When the stakes of the parties differ, Priest with larger stakes has more to lose from the litigation and therefore is likely to offer enough to settle the case, from the perspective of the party with a lesser stake, in order to avoid a larger loss at trial.12 Thus the cases that are selected for trial are likely to be ones in which the party with the greater stakes has a relatively better chance for success than would be the case when the stakes are equal.
Among litigated cases in which the defendant has higher stakes than the plaintiff, then, we would expect the plaintiff win rate to be less than 50 percent. In an employment discrimination case, for example, the fact that an adverse judgment at trial harms the employer/defendant (in terms of reputation, or in terms of the influence of an adverse judgment on other pending or not-yet-filed claims) more than it benefits the employee/ plaintiff means that the plaintiff win rate in employment discrimination cases, all else equal, should be less than 50 percent.
A number of studies have analyzed deviations from the 50 percent baseline as the possible consequence of differential party stakes. Priest and Klein's disaggregated data showed that product liability and medical malpractice cases displayed plaintiff success rates significantly below the predicted 50 percent." Priest and Klein hypothesize that manufacturers had greater stakes than persons harmed in products liability cases because of the danger of an unfavorable judicial precedent, and doctors had more at stake than patients because of the potential harm to their reputations from an unfavorable verdict.14 Results obtained by Danzon and A simple example illustrates this point in the context of the civil justice system. Assume that there is a sample of lawsuits, half of which are good suits that will generate a judgment for the plaintiff of $100 if brought to trial, and half of which are bad lawsuits that will generate a judgment for the defendant-at-trial. Defendants are highly sophisticated, so that the defendant always knows which of the two categories-good or bad-a particular case falls into. Plaintiffs, in contrast, are unsophisticated and are unable to sort cases accurately into good or bad cases. Plaintiffs randomly assign values of $0 or $100 to cases without regard to their likelihood of success at trial. This yields four possible states, each with equal probability: Defendants Plaintiffs A. $100 $100 B.
$100 $0
At pretrial settlement negotiations, both plaintiffs and defendants always demand or offer what they think the case is worth: $100 if they believe the case is good, and nothing if they believe the case is bad. Cases falling into categories A and B will settle for $100-the defendant's offer of $100 either equals or exceeds the plaintiff's demand of $100 or $0. Cases falling into category D settle for $0-the parties agree to a dismissal. Only cases that fall into category C do not settle since the plaintiff demands $100 and the defendant offers nothing. But such cases are always losers for plaintiffs since we have assumed that the sophisticated defendant only offers nothing if the case is worth nothing.
In this example, defendants would win 100 percent of the time in cases that progressed to trial. More generally, the selection effect of party sophistication means that the sophisticated party will win a higher percentage of the cases selected for trial than will unsophisticated parties. The empirical evidence provides at least weak support for this hypothesis; parties who might be considered unsophisticated, such as prisoners and civil rights plaintiffs, have an abnormally low success rate.
Mismeasurement of Plaintiff Victory, or Damages versus Liability. In several types of civil cases, parties frequently litigate damages, with liability conceded (for example, rear-end accident litigation). In the studies discussed in Table 1 , the standard for plaintiff "success" is typically whether the plaintiff received any benefit at trial or appeal.'" By this standard, though, plaintiffs will appear to succeed far more often than they actually do in those cases in which the dispute is essentially over damages, which means that the 50 percent rule may not hold as an artifact of case accounting. 19 Again, the point can be illustrated with a simple numerical example. Assume that the plaintiff and the defendant agree that the defendant will have to pay the plaintiff something, but cannot agree on how much. The plaintiff demands $100, and the defendant is not willing to offer more than $50. Assume that half of the time the plaintiff accurately predicts the trial outcome-the plaintiff will receive $100 at trial-and the other half of the time the defendant correctly predicts that the plaintiff will receive $50. The observed trial outcomes will be that the plaintiff gets $50 half of the time and $100 half of the time. According to the metric used in the standard empirical studies, this would represent a 100 percent plaintiff success rate. But on the issue of damages-which is the only real issue in the case-the actual success rate for plaintiffs would be only 50 percent: only half of the time do plaintiffs receive at trial what they demanded from defendants in settlement negotiations, while the rest of the time defendants win the victory because they are forced to pay no more than they would have been willing to pay in settlement.
The theory that high levels of plaintiff success can be explained by the incidence of suits where damages rather than liability is in dispute is developed by Ramseyer and Nakazato to support the observed high rates of plaintiff victors in their data set.20 It also appears likely that a damages effect explains the high level of plaintiff victories (approximately 83 percent) observed by Wittman in his study of rear-end accident litigation in California;21 because most rear-end accidents appear to present an obvious case for liability, the litigation in these cases was almost certainly focused on disputes over the amount of damages.
Legal Standard Favors One Side. If the legal standard that is applied at trial favors one side over the other, then the strict version of the 50 percent rule may not hold under a wide range of circumstances. Indeed, Priest and Klein recognize that the divergent expectations model only predicts that the plaintiff win rate among litigated cases will tend toward 50 percent, not be equal to 50 percent. Put another way, the 50 percent rule implies that a change in the decision standard that would decrease ~9 Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 29; Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 338-39; Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 10, at 284. 20 Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 10, at 263. the probability of plaintiff victory by x percent, if all disputes were litigated, would decrease the probability of plaintiff victory among actually litigated disputes by less than x percent. This result might arise in two plausible situations. First, if parties' error in assessing the probability of plaintiff victory is normally distributed, then the share of winning plaintiffs in the pool of litigated cases will fall as the decision standard leans more toward the defendant because the probability distribution of errors around the decision standard will become progressively asymmetric.22 Second, if a small number of cases are litigated at random because (for example) a small number of disputes have at least one irrational litigant, then the probability of plaintiff victory in the pool of litigated cases will be a weighted average of the probability of plaintiff victory in all disputes and 50 percent. As the probability of plaintiff victory in all disputes decreases, so then would the probability of plaintiff victory in litigated disputes, albeit at a slower rate.
Settlement Costs High Relative to Litigation Costs. As settlement costs rise relative to litigation costs, the number of litigated disputes increases. Consider the extreme case, in the model of divergent expectations presented above, where there were no savings from settlement: in other words, C = S. In this case, the parties settle only if P, = Pd, and virtually all cases are litigated. Therefore the probability of a plaintiff victory in a litigated dispute tends toward the probability of plaintiff victory in the population as a whole. If other factors lead the probability of plaintiff victory in the population of all cases to be less than 50 percent, then cases with high settlement costs will exhibit a plaintiff win rate of less than half.
Even if this sort of example is unrealistic in the context of trial, it may be realistic at the appellate stage. Assume, for example, that a case has generated a verdict for the defendant-at-trial. Both risk-neutral parties know that the plaintiff's probability of success on appeal is 5 percent. The plaintiff's litigation costs for the appeal are $3,000, and the defendant's litigation costs for appeal are also $3,000. The transactions costs of negotiating a settlement on appeal are $5,000 for each party. The reason that the transactions costs of settling exceed the litigation costs is that the appeal involves a simple question of law that the parties have already fully briefed and argued during trial motions. In these conditions settlement will not occur because the parties would spend more negotiating a settlement than they would in prosecuting and defending the appeal. The appeal will go forward, generating affirmances in 95 percent of the cases. This effect may partly explain the observation, in numerous studies of appellate outcomes, that appellants typically succeed far less than 50 percent of the time. Appellants face a difficult burden on appeal because they must convince the appeals court either that the trier of fact erred or that the judge misconstrued the applicable law. One would expect, therefore, that most of the cases selected for appeal because the settlement costs exceed the litigation costs will end up as affirmances, a prediction consistent with the empirical evidence.
High Awards. Throughout the divergent expectations model, parties to a dispute are assumed to be risk-neutral; in other words, they are only concerned with the expected value of a case, not with the variance of possible outcomes around the expected value.
Of course, this assumption is an imperfect approximation of reality. Litigants, particularly plaintiffs as a class, would be risk-averse over the range of possible outcomes of a case if the expected value of the case amounted to a substantial fraction of the litigant's total wealth.
Risk aversion, then, tends to increase the gains to settlement, thereby causing fewer disputes to be litigated. If the probability of a plaintiff victory in the population is less than 50 percent, cases with high awards will follow the 50 percent rule more closely than cases with lower awards.
Agency Effects. Law suits are ostensibly brought in the name of parties, but the parties are typically represented by attorneys who have their own interests to serve in the litigation. This problem is particularly acute in the case of settlement.23 Attorneys who work on an hourly fee basis have an incentive to defer settlement and to continue working on the case as long as their return per hour of work on the case exceeds their opportunity cost of time. Thus, hourly fee attorneys may sometimes recommend against settlement early in the litigation even when settlement would be in the client's best interest. Contingency fee lawyers present a converse problem: the contingency fee lawyer has an incentive to settle a case very early in the litigation, even for an amount much lower than the client would receive after trial, because the attorney bears all the litigation expenses and can earn a high hourly fee by an early settlement.
These incentive effects, which are well known, suggest that cases in which the plaintiff is represented by an attorney on an hourly fee basis will have a lower success rate at trial than cases where the attorney is working on a contingent fee, if the probability of plaintiff victory in the population of all cases is less than 50 percent, because the hourly fee lawyer has a greater incentive to defer settlement and thus move the case toward trial.
The incentive of hourly fee attorneys to litigate, however, may be mitigated by reputation effects. While the hourly fee attorney has an incentive to delay settlement up to a point close to trial, once trial is in the offing the hourly fee lawyer's incentives are more ambiguous. Trial may be risky for the hourly fee attorney because the attorney risks losing the case. A loss, and especially a repeated series of losses, can have an adverse effect on the attorney's reputation because clients and other lawyers may conclude that the loss was due either to the attorney's bad trial skills or to his or her bad advice to the client. The client is also likely to blame the attorney for the loss, especially if the attorney has previously assured the client that the prospects for success in the litigation are good. Thus, as trial approaches, the hourly fee attorney has much more to lose from not settling than he or she does early in the litigation. One might infer that hourly fee attorneys are likely to try hard to settle cases as trial approaches and that the cases that do not settle will often be those for which the attorney could not get a realistic settlement offer-cases where the probability of success is relatively good.
The result that hourly fee attorneys litigate more than contingency fee attorneys may also be mitigated by the fact that contingency fee attorneys have reputation effects that encourage them to litigate, ceteris paribus. Far from dreading a loss at trial, a contingency fee attorney might see it as offering reputational advantages. By taking a case to trial, even if the case is unsuccessful, the contingency fee attorney demonstrates that he or she is able to go to trial with a weak case. This makes the attorney's threats of trial more credible in settlement negotiations. Further, it is unlikely that an unsuccessful case will harm the attorney's reputation with potential clients. Most contingency fee clients are going to be oneshot players who do not have good information about the quality of their attorney. Even if the client had access to the lawyer's track record, a history of some trial losses would not necessarily be grounds for alarm since the client could rationally conclude that the trial losses increase the attorney's ability to threaten trial in settlement negotiations and since the costs of trial are typically going to be borne in any event by the attorney and not the client.
But if the client controls the decision to litigate, then agency effects can have the opposite effect. Because the client bears less than the true cost of litigation under a contingency fee contract, and at least the true cost of litigation under an hourly fee contract, contingency fee plaintiffs would be more likely to litigate than hourly fee plaintiffs. Alternatively, Gross and Syverud point out that, if plaintiffs as a class are more liquid- ity-constrained than attorneys, then they will be less willing to go to trial when paying the attorney on an hourly basis than when the attorney represents the plaintiff on a contingency fee. 24 Thus, the effect of the agency effects associated with different fee arrangements on the selection of cases for litigation is theoretically indeterminate, and it depends on the relative control that the attorney and client have over the decision to litigate. By implication, the effect of contingency fee contracts versus hourly fee contracts on the probability of plaintiff victory at trial is also indeterminate. Assuming that the probability of plaintiff victory in the population at large is less than 50 percent, if clients control the decision to litigate, then contingency fee contracts should be associated with a lower probability of plaintiff victory; if attorneys control the decision to litigate, then contingency fee contracts should be associated with a higher probability of plaintiff victory.
THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
The predicted effect of each of the seven multimodal characteristics discussed above on the probability of plaintiff victory is summarized in Table 2 , assuming that the probability of plaintiff victory in the population of claims at large is less than 50 percent. For the differential stakes category, as with the differential sophistication and legal standard favors one side categories, we report the predicted effect of the defendant having the characteristic; an analogous prediction could be made for the plaintiff. These records contain information on the nature of the case. Civil cases are first categorized as being either "private" or "federal" cases. The "private civil" category is divided into 105 subcategories in ten broad areas, which are used by the district courts in their initial classification of the cases.25 The records also include the date of docketing, the date of disposition, and the nature of the disposition.26
The Administrative Office also provided us with a computerized database consisting of some 15,397 civil and criminal appeals that had been docketed in the Seventh Circuit from 1980 through 1989. These records indicate the names of the first named plaintiff and the first named defendant in the district court. In the civil appeals, we attempted to match the plaintiffs' names in this general database with the names of appellees or appellants in the termination database. Of these, we found 3,529 civil cases decided on the merits for which we were able to identify the appellant as either plaintiff or defendant. Table 3 presents the outcomes of trials, at each stage of the process, by subcategory of litigation. The data suggest that the simple version of the 50 percent rule does not hold. The last row of the third column of Table 3 shows that the fraction of plaintiffs-at-trial who won after appeals had been decided was 31.4 percent. Consistent with this, the overwhelming majority of suit types show a plaintiff win rate of less than 50 percent. Table 3 also shows that appellants, taken together, win fewer than half of their cases, and, with the exception of appellants in certain civil rights cases, appellants win less frequently than do plaintiffs-at-trial. Overall, 27.3 percent of appellants won their appeals, compared to 26.9 percent of plaintiffs-at-trial. But this does not make clear that, in 50 of 70 categories (71.4 percent), appellants are less likely to win than plaintiffs-at-trial. Put another way, excluding categories 440-442 (civil rights, voting-civil rights, and jobs-civil rights cases), plaintiffs won 30.4 percent of cases at trial, but appellants won only 26.8 percent of cases. It appears that the simple version of the 50 percent rule holds neither at trial nor on appeal. Table 4 shows how we consolidated the 70 suit types into the seven multimodal categories. To review the 70 suit codes reported in the database to determine which of the seven characteristics discussed above each had, we collapse closely related suit codes into common groups.27
We then omit categories that have less than 20 cases that could not be grouped to avoid statistical problems. Although several categories have cases that are civil in form, we omit them from the study because they are not civil in substance. Thus, both state habeas and federal section 2255 attack substantive aspects of criminal proceedings and were omitted. Finally, we examine data on filings in several catch-all categories, such as "miscellaneous contract" or "other statutory" and either find we are able to categorize them or conclude that the cases in the category are too varied to be characterized. 
IV. THE MODEL AND RESULTS
We
where Q(*) is the cumulative normal distribution function. Maximumlikelihood estimation of this "probit" model chooses P to maximize the likelihood of observing the sample, thereby providing estimates of the effect of each multimodal characteristic on the probability of plaintiff victory, holding the other characteristics of a case constant. 29 We estimated the probit model above defining plaintiff success in terms of plaintiff success at trial, plaintiff success in the litigation process as a whole, and appellant success. Because the raw probit results cannot be easily interpreted in terms of probabilities,30 we calculated the effect of each multimodal characteristic on the probability of plaintiff victory as 28 The variables Yi and Y,* can be defined in terms of plaintiff success at trial, plaintiff success in the litigation process as a whole, or appellant success. 29 the difference between the probability of plaintiff success for a case that had a particular multimodal characteristic and the probability of plaintiff success for a case that did not, assuming all of the other characteristics of the case were equal to the average characteristics in the sample." Table 5 presents these probabilities and their standard errors; the raw probit estimates are presented in Appendix B. The first column of Table 5 provides estimates of the effect of each of the multimodal characteristics on the probability of a plaintiff win at trial. The estimated effects are in line with the theoretical predictions of the multimodal approach found in Table 2 . The first row of the first column shows that high defendant stakes decrease the probability of plaintiff victory at trial for the average case by 3.8 percentage points, ceteris paribus: defendants with large amounts at stake in litigation settle with weaker plaintiffs more frequently than they otherwise would. In line with the theory, superior defendant information also decreases the probability of plaintiff victory at trial, by 7.3 percentage points. Mismeasurement and relatively high settlement costs result in deviations from the strict 50 percent rule as well. Plaintiffs in cases in which disputes are more likely to be over damages are 6.0 percentage points more likely to be scored as winning at trial. And, as the divergent expectations model would predict, plaintiffs in cases with high settlement costs are 4.2 percentage points less likely to win at trial, all else being held constant. All of these effects are statistically different from zero at least at a 90 percent level of significance.
Agency effects and high awards are the most important determinants of the selection of cases for litigation. A plaintiff in a case that is average except for divergences of interest between the plaintiff and the attorney due to the presence of a contingency fee contract is 13.7 percentage points less likely to win, holding other multimodal characteristics constant. This effect is statistically different from zero at a 99 percent level of significance. This finding provides evidence that clients, not lawyers, control the decision to litigate. If clients control the decision to litigate, then contingency fee contracts would be associated with increased litigation and a lower probability of plaintiff victory at trial and on appeal; if attorneys control the decision to litigate, then contingency fee contracts would be associated with less litigation and a high probability of plaintiff victory.
Surprisingly, the effect of high awards on the probability of plaintiff victory at trial is approximately as large as the effect of superior defendant information and agency effects combined. Plaintiffs in cases with high awards experience dramatically more success at trial than their otherwise similar counterparts: these plaintiffs are fully 20.0 percent more likely to win at trial, all else being constant. The fact that large stakes are associated with increased plaintiff victory at trial means that large stakes reduce the probability of litigation, all else being constant: in other words, large stakes encourage risk-averse parties to settle so as to avoid ending up a huge winner or loser.
The second and third columns of Table 5 show the effect of each multimodal characteristic on the probability that the plaintiff-at-trial would win after appeals are completed and the probability of the appellant winning, respectively. Reestimating the multimodal model with these other dependent variables shows that the basic principles behind the results presented in the first column are insensitive to the manner in which "plaintiff victory" is defined. The signs of most of the multimodal effects remain the same across models with differently defined dependent variables. In addition, the effect of high defendant stakes, high awards, and agency effects on plaintiff victory remain significant in at least one of the two alternative specifications.
Other diagnostics support the validity of the multimodal approach. If the estimated probability of plaintiff victory for the baseline type of case (for example, a case with none of the seven multimodal characteristics that we analyze) in the multimodal model is closer to 50 percent than the probability of plaintiff victory in the raw data, then a multimodal approach that controls for deviations from the assumptions behind the divergent expectations model helps to reconcile the 50 percent rule with the data. Calculations of the probability of plaintiff victory for the baseline case from the raw probit results in Appendix B32 show that controlling for multimodal characteristics in fact brings the probability of plaintiff victory closer to 50 percent. The raw probability of plaintiff victory at trial is 26.9 percent (Table 3, This article investigates whether a "multimodal" approach to the selection of cases for litigation can reconcile the validity of the selection hypothesis in general with observed win rates of less than 50 percent. The multimodal approach hypothesizes that violations of assumptions of the simple divergent expectations model affect the selection of cases for litigation, thereby driving the win rate away from 50 percent.
Based on data from 3,529 cases decided by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals between 1982 and 1987, we find that our approach explains win rates of less than 50 percent within the context of a divergent expectations model. First and foremost, case characteristics associated with violations of assumptions of the divergent expectations model affect win rates in the manner that simple law-and-economics models would predict. We examine seven characteristics of cases: differential stakes, differential information, mismeasurement of plaintiff victory, legal standard favoring one side, settlement costs being high relative to litigation costs, high awards, and agency effects. All of these characteristics affects win rates in the manner that the theory would suggest, six out of the seven in a statistically significant way.
Second, we find that controlling for multimodal characteristics brings the win rate closer to 50 percent. In other words, among cases that conform more closely to the assumptions underlying the Priest-Klein model, the win rate is closer to 50 percent. Also, the data show that the multimodal approach applies in a similar fashion at each stage of the appeals process, further supporting its applicability.
Thus, we argue that the best approach to understanding the selection of cases for litigation is a multimodal one, which does not rely on any single overarching theory to predict trial outcomes. Our article discusses a number of possible mechanisms that may drive case outcomes away from the 50 percent baseline, based on simple models. We attempt to consolidate the leading explanations for why outcomes deviate from 50 percent in a general multimodal approach.
We caution that our approach is only tentative. The effects we discuss find some support in the empirical evidence, but more documentation would be required before particular characteristics could be confidently identified as determining outcomes in particular classes of cases. Moreover, there may well be other important mechanisms that we have not discussed that significantly influence outcomes.33 Our approach should be viewed as preliminary, although it provides a potentially valuable framework for further research. The task now is for researchers to engage in detailed investigation of selection effects in particular classes of cases in order to understand the dynamic forces at play in individualized contexts. 
APPENDIX
